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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MOJAVE URANIUM COMP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs. -
MESA PETROLEUM COMP ANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11286 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Mojave Uranium Com-
pany against Mesa Petroleum Company, the successor 
in interest to Standard Gilsonite Company, upon a con-
tractual agreement between Mojave and Standard. The 
agreement consists of an unsecured obligation in the 
amount of $20,000.00 for the release of an earlier claim 
Mojave asserted against Standard which was secured 
by a second mortgage upon personality of Standard. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, upon hearing reciprocal motions for 
summary judgment, denied that of Mojave's and granted 
Mesa's upon the grounds that Mojave's claim was "barred 
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mesa Petroleum Company seeks an affirmance of 
its Summary Judgment since as a matter of law, Ap-
pellant's claim is barred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as stated 
by Appellant, however, Respondent feels that some per-
tinent facts have not been stated and further desires to 
correct certain erroneous conclusions which have been 
stated as fact. 
Sometime during the period of 1957-1961 Mojave al-
legedly loaned (R. 1) to Standard certain sums of money 
which was uncertain both as to the amount and as to 
the source of the funds so loaned. (Depo. 43 & 45) At 
any rate, Mojave held a second mortgage on certain 
personal property of Standard which bears the date of 
March 2, 1960. (Ex. P-17) Standard became financially 
distressed during 1960-1962 and was constantly beseiged 
by suits, demands of creditors and repossessions. (Depo. 
5, 16 & 17) 
A closer examination must be given to the origin 
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of the agreement reached between the parties which 
constitutes exhibit P-6 and P-7. Mr. Robert J. Pinder, 
past president of Standard and close relative of the offi-
cers of Mojave, represented Mojave in the negotiations 
which culminated in the agreement. ( Depo. 6, 11, 16, 38, 
39) These alleged loans were made during the period 
of Pinder's presidency. The corporate entity of Mojave 
is and was of serious doubt, having had its charter re-
voked by Nevada and having failed to qualify to do busi-
ness in Utah. (R. 5, 6, 7; Depo. 46) Further, there 
was serious question as to the validity of the alleged 
loans. (Depo. 40, 41, 43, 44, 45) Because of these ques-
tionable aspects of the Mojave claim, together with the 
fact that the security was either nonexistent, dissipated 
or worthless (Depo. 17, 19, 40, 41) and the additional 
threat of a Chapter X proceeding (Ex. P-6), Mojave 
desired to become an unsecured creditor. The sole con-
sideration given to Standard for this privilege was the 
release of the worthless security. (Depo. 41) 
A close examination must be given the financial bal-
ance sheets to which the Appellant places great weight. 
These balance sheets were prepared under extremely 
difficult circumstances and reflect almost in total the 
unverified recollections of Pinder. (Depo. 6, 11, 16, 17, 
38, 39) Disputes and questions were raised on a number 
of the claims including that of Mojave's. (Depo. 43, 45, 
46) No documentation other than the balance sheets 
of Standard has been discovered verifying the alleged 
loan or loans between .Mojave and Standard. Mr. Bruce 
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Coke, Counsel for Standard at the time of the Chapter 
XI proceedings, informed the accountants who prepared 
the financial sheets for Standard of the serious ques-
tions regarding the validity of the Mojave claim (Depa. 
43, 44, 45), and stated that he specifically recalls inform-
ing the accountants that the principals of Standard had 
reservations regarding the Mojave claim. (Depo. 45) 
This same question of validity was conveyed to Mesa. 
(Depo. 29) 
POINT I 
CONFIRMATION OF STANDARD'S PLAN OF AR-
RANGEMENT DISCHARGED MOJAVE'S CLAIM. 
The Chandler Act, which was passed in 1938 and 
is the present day statutory provision relating to Bank-
ruptcy, gives broad relief for financially distressed busi-
nesses by means of composition and/or extension of 
'Unsecured obligations. The Chandler Act affords relief 
that could not and cannot be obtained at common law. 
Chapter XI proceedings under the 1938 Act are set forth 
in detail, together with the effects of these proceedings, 
in United States Code, Title 11, Section 701 et al. 
Basically, there are two routes a petitioner under 
Chapter XI can elect to take with respect to unsecured 
obligations: (1) a plan can be merely an "extension of 
time" within which to pay creditors, or (2) a plan can 
be a "composition," provided certain conditions are met, 
which satisfies and pays in full the unsecured obligations. 
together with contingent unsecured obligations of anY 
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secured creditors which may arise after exhaustion of 
the security. 
Standard, predecessor of Respondent, chose the lat-
ter route, seeking a composition of the unsecured credi-
tors. On May 25, 1962 Standard filed a direct petition 
under Section 322 of the Chandler Act. A proposed plan 
of composition was submitted on June 12, 1962, and 
subsequently on August 13, 1962 an Order of Confirma-
tion of the plan was granted by the Referee in Bank-
ruptcy. 
An agreement was consummated between Mojave 
and Standard wherein Appellant became an unsecured 
creditor in the amount of $20,000. The formal agreement 
was executed sometime in June 1962. (Ex. P-6 & P-7) 
The sole consideration for this agreement was the release 
of the security. (Depo. 41) Appellant was aware of the 
Chapter XI proceedings, and knew of the legal conse-
quences following the release. Appellant could either 
release the worthless and non-existent security, or face 
proceedings under Chapter X of the Chandler Act. (Ex. 
P-6 & P-7) There is no argument that at this date 
Appellant did in fact release its security. 
The real question before this Court is what effect, 
if any, did the confirmation of Standard's Chapter XI 
proceedings have upon the agreement of June, 1962 
which placed Mojave in the status of an unsecured 
creditod The language of the Act itself answers this 
decisive question. 
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SECTION 307: 
"(l) "creditors shall include the holders of all 
unsecured debts, demands or claims of what-
ever character against a debtor .... " 
SECTION 308: 
"A creditor shall be deemed to be "affected" by 
an arrangement only if his interest shall be ma-
terially and adversely affected thereby." 
SECTION 367: 
"Upon confirmation of an arrangement -
(1) the arrangement and its provisions shall 
be binding upon the debtor, upon any person 
issuing securities or acquiring property un-
der the arrangement and upon all creditors 
of the debtor, whether or not they are affected 
by the arrangement, or have accepted it or 
have filed their claims, and whether or not 
their claims have been scheduled or allowed 
and are allowable;" (emphasis added) 
SECTION 371: 
"The confirmation of an arrangement shall dis-
charge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and 
liabilities provided for by the arrangement." (em-
phasis added) 
It is upon confirmation that the rights of the parties are 
crystallized and become fixed under the clear and con-
cise language of the Statute. Confirmation was realized 
on August 13, 1962, well after Mojave became an un-
secured creditor. Mojave, being an imsecitred creditor 
of Standard's upon confirmation, was and is bound by 
that Order. 
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Appellant would have this Court believe that the 
critical time is the date of filing of the original petition. 
'rhat date is important only to determine whether Mo-
jave was in fact a creditor per se. Appellant cites a 
very old case decided under a completely different Act 
as the controlling case law. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 
625, 33 S. Ct. 365, 57 L. Ed. G7G (1913) actually inter-
preted the 1898 Act. 1'he present day provisions of the 
Chandler Act is decisive that "upon confirmation ... " 
the rights of the parties are determined and bound. In 
Gerson v. Booth Lumber Company, 230 F.2d 631 (1955) 
which was decided after passage of the Chandler Act, 
Justice Fee of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
at page 633: 
''It is correct to say that a plan of arrangement 
is not binding on the debtor or the creditors of 
the debtor 1mtil it has been confirmd by the order 
of the Referee."' (emphasis added) 
Congress gave further expression to the importance 
of the binding effect of the arrangement upon unsecured 
creditors which are unsec11red on the critical date of 
confirmation in Section 381. This provision refers to 
proceedings wherein bankruptcy in the usual sense be-
comes necessary after a confirmation has failed and the 
debtor is adjudged a bankrupt. This generally occurs 
when the terms of the arrangement have been breached 
or become impossible. It then becomes necessary to 
provide for the unsecured obligations incurred after the 
confirmation. Section 381 states: 
"vVlwre, aftPr tlw confirmation of an arrange-
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ment, the court shall enter an order directing 
that bankruptcy be proceeded with ... 
(1) the unsecured debts incurred by the debt. 
or after the confirmation of the arrangement 
and before the date of the entry of the final 
order directing that bankruptcy be proceeded 
with shall, unless and except as otherwise pro-
vided in the arrangement or in the order 
confirming the arrangement, share on a par-
ity with the prior unsecured debts of the same 
classes, provable in the ensuing bankruptcy 
proceeding, and for such purpose the prior 
unsecured debts shall be deemed to be re-
duced to the amounts respectively provided 
for them in the arrangement, less any pay-
ment made thereunder;" 
Obviously there is no need to provide for a creditor 
who was unsecured at the time of confirmation since 
Congress had already provided that they would be bound 
upon confirmation. 
Collier's Bankruptcy Manital, Second Edition, edited 
by Edelman and as revised by William T. Laube and 
W. J. Hill (1968) pages 1098-1099 states: 
"An arrangement becomes effective only iipon 
confirmation by the Court." (emphasis added) 
Confirmation is the vital and key step which hinds 
and discharges all unsecured obligations. The import· 
ance of the confirmation is expressed in In Re Graco, Inc., 
366 F2d 257 (1966) at page 260 as follows: 
"It is clear that the determination of the referee 
is not supposed to be a perfunctory one, and th.e 
fact that the plan has been accepted by a reqUJ· 
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site majority of creditors does not dispense with 
the need for the referee to exercise his 'own inde-
pendent judgment.'" (citations omitted) 
The recent case of Poly Inditstries, Inc. vs. Mozley, 
:102 F.2d 453 ( 1966) gives a clear and decisive ruling of 
the Chandler Act. The court states, at page 456: 
" ... the confinnation of a Chapter XI arrange-
ment acts the same as a discharge in bankruptcy 
" 
The obligation to Mojave, if any, upon confirma-
tion was discharged by the terms and conditions of the 
arrangement. On August 13, 1962 the rights of the par-
ties were fixed and became binding upon Mojave as well 
as the other general unsecured creditors. 
Appellant would have us believe that since no spe-
cific reference to the Mojave debt appears in the Order 
of Confirmation and the Arrangement that under Section 
371, the obligation to Mojave, if any, was not barred 
or satisfied. However, as Exhibit P-3 shows, the plan 
is for "all unsecured general claims." This provision 
applies to Appellant. It is well established that the scope 
of Section 361 is sweeping and the term "all unsecured 
general claims" is broad enough to include Appellant. 
In speaking of the provisions of Section 367 ( 1), 
Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Edition, Volume 9, Section 
9.25 ( 5), page 340-341 states: 
wrhat reference to creditors is a sweeping one. It 
is not essential to confirmation that an arrange-
ment be accepted by all creditors, but creditors 
10 
who have not accepted the arrangement as well 
as creditors who have accepted it are bound 
upon confirmation. A creditor cann~t escape the 
effect. of an arrang~ment by not filing a proof 
of claim; such a creditor, as well as creditors who 
have filed their claims, is bound upon confirma-
tion. Nor is it material whether a creditor's 
claim has been scheduled, or is allowed, or is 
even allowable, or whether the creditor is affected 
by the arrangement. That creditor is neverthe-
less bound by the arrangement and its provisions 
upon confirmation. Even if an unscheduled credi-
tor did not know of the proceeding, he is bound 
upon confirmation. Even if a creditor is affected 
by the arrangement, and it makes no provision 
for him, so that he could have successfully op· 
posed its confirmation, he is nevertheless bound 
by the arrangement and its provisions upon con· 
firmation." 
It is apparent from the foregoing that Appellant 
is bound upon confirmation to the provisions of the ar· 
rangement. On August 13, 1962, Appellant was an wn-
secured creditor, who had actual notice of the proceed-
ings (see Exhibit P-6), who could have availed itself of 
the same provisions which were applicable to all general 
unsecured creditors. The release was given under the 
guise of benefiting Standard, when in fact Mojave knew 
that the alleged security was dissipated, non-existent and 
worthless. In addition there was serious doubt whether 
there was ever any obligation due Mojave. Mojave saw 
an opportunity to trade an absolutely worthless and 
questionable claim into an unsecured claim. It did so 
and should be held to the effect of that transaction. 
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The arrangement provided all unsecured creditors with 
equal rights to share in a distribution approved by a 
majority of the creditors which is binding upon all wn-
secured creditors upon confirmation. 
The fact that the appellant neither filed its claim, 
nor participated in the distribution is immaterial. Mojave 
cannot be permitted to have the benefit of its bargain, 
or what was bargained for on its behalf by the other 
unsecured creditors, and later say it didn't mean to be 
bound as an unsecured creditor. The ramifications of 
the release were known to both Standard and Mojave, 
and the law is unequivocal that upon confirmation the 
parties are bound. 
Section 357 of the Chandler Act provides: 
"An arrangement made within the meaning of 
this Chapter may include -
(1) provisions for treatment of unsecured 
debts on a parity one with the other, ... " 
In effect, Mojave is now before this Court seeking a bet-
ter and more desirable position than other general un-
secured creditors. Appellant would seek to negate the 
proceedings insofar as they apply to it based on the 
release of the worthless security and its failure to par-
ticipate in the distribution under the plan. 
Zavelo v. Reeves, supra, is not the controlling case 
a::; Appellant would have us believe. Zavelo, a 1913 case, 
\\as decided by a Court interpreting .the provisions of 
the Act of Julv 1, 1898, Chapter 54i, 30 Stat. L. 544, 
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which had a total of two sections relating to composi-
tions (to be distinguished from corporate arrangements). 
These two sections were codified as sections 12 and 13 
of Chapter 3 of the 1898 Act. The only pertinent pro-
visions was section 12 ( e) wherein it was stated: 
"(e) Upon the confirmation of a composition, the 
consideration shall be distributed as the judge 
shall direct, and the case dismissed. Wherever a 
composition is not confirmed, the estate shall be 
administered in bankruptcy as herein provided." 
Under the old 1898 Act, a petitioner in bankruptcy 
could offe,r a composition to his creditors and, if ac-
cepted, would not be formally adjudicated a bankrupt. 
He could pay to his creditors the compromised amount 
and the case against him would be dismissed. All of this 
was changed by the Chandler Act of 1938. The 1938 
Act, together with its amendments, specify in detail the 
remedies and relief available to a financially distressed 
corporation under Chapter XI, as well as Chapter X. 
Contrast the two meager provisions of the 1898 Act 
with the 100 sections contained in Chapter XI alone. It 
is the provisions of the Chandler Act of 1938 and its 
subsequent amendments that are controlling of this con· 
troversy. It is upon confirmation that unsecured credi· 
tors are bound. It is the sweeping and broad provisions 
of the Chandler Act which state clearly and concisely 
that the alleged Mojave debt is barred. 
The next two cases are illustrative of the vast dif · 
f erences between the 1898 Act and the Chandler Act. 
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The Court in In Re Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400 (1933) at page 
401 stated: 
"In the usual proceedings, the debtor is adjudi-
cated a bankrupt, and divested of his property. 
But, where the proceedings result in the confir-
mation of an offer of composition, the case is 
dismissed, even though the debtor has not yet 
been adjudicated a bankrupt. (citations omitted) 
The debtor is reinvested with all of his property 
except such as may have been deposited with the 
court to secure performance of the composition." 
Contrast K orbluth with the current, clear, and un-
ambiguous language of Section 367 and the judicial 
pronouncement in In Re Vulcan & Reiter Co., 162 F.2d 
92 (1947), a per curiam decision, which is indicative of 
the provisions of Chapter XI. At page 94 it states: 
" ... It makes no difference that petitioner did 
not actually consent to the composition, the con-
sent of the majority in number and amount of 
creditors has the same legal effect as actual con-
sent by petitioner. Creditors, including petitioner, 
having received what they bargained for or what 
was bargained for in their behalf as the case may 
be, have no further claim to receive the balance 
of their original claims from any source." (Court's 
emphasis) 
Another very recent case expressive of the new 
provisions dealing with this particular issue is Frey v. 
Prankle, 361 F.2d, 437 (1966), decided by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on April 15, 1966, (rehearing 
denied June 17, 1966). In that case discussions were held 
between Frey, who was then president of the corporation 
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which had filed Chapter XI proceedings, and Frankle, 
the successor in interest under the proceedings, wherein 
Frey was to be given an option to purchase one-third of 
the new stock which was to be issued, together with a 
five-year contract of employment with the reorganized 
corporation at a salary of $2,000.00 per month. This 
plan was rejected by the creditors and not approved, 
and a subsequent plan which did not contain these pro-
visions desired by Frey was approved. The Court states 
(at page 442) through Justice Pickett: 
"The parties are substantially in agreement that 
from the beginning of the negotiations between 
Frankle and Frey, it was contemplated that Frey 
would be employed by the reorganized corpora-
tion and would have an option to acquire suffi-
cient shares to assure him one-third interest in 
the controlling stock. These contemplated provi-
sions were submitted to and considered by a com-
mittee representing the creditors of the corpora-
tion, and were not included in the plan which 
was submitted to the Court for approval. Al-
though Frey, in his first cause of action, alleged 
that his employment and stock purchase option 
should have been included in the plan, it was not, 
and when the order of confirmation became final, 
the rights of the party were fixed as of its entry. 
(citations omitted) ·when the plan became effec-
tive, Frey's position with the corporation was 
terminated, and he had no legal right to employ-
ment." (emphasis added). 
'l_1he Frey case, supra, illustrates two vital points 
applicable to our controversy. First, the court reaffirmed 
the clear language of the statutes by emphasizing that 
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the rights of the parties were fixed when the order of 
confirmation became final. Secondly, the negotiations 
spoken of between the parties were after the original 
petition was filed, but prior to the confirmation. The 
plan became effective and Frey no longer had any rights 
even though the newly organized corporation retained 
Frey some six months after the confirmation at $2,000.00 
per month. 
The case of Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally 
& Company, 195 F. Supp. 621 (1961) controls the issues 
before this Court. Wise filed its petition under Chapter 
XI on November 16, 1955. Rand filed a proof of claim 
May 23, 1956 as a secured creditor. Wise objected to 
Rand's claim on several grounds. Finally on July 27, 
1956 a stipulation was entered into wherein one-half of 
Rand's claim became unsecured and the remaining one-
half was secured. At pages 623 and 624 of the Reporter 
it states: 
"This was followed by the filing, in the arrange-
ment proceeding, of a stipulation between the 
parties, dated July 27, 1956, which fixed the value 
of the 13,915 copies held by Rand at $10,017.59, 
one-half the indebtedness admitted by Wise. In 
its capacity as unsecured creditor, Rand accepted 
Plaintiff's plan of arrangement which was af-
firmed on August 2, 1956. The sum of $10,017.59 
was allowed Rand as an unsecured claim for which 
it might receive payments under the plan." 
The confirmation was August 2, 1956, after the stipula-
tion which made Rand an unsecured creditor. The ar-
rangement was binding upon Rand. 
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Respondent submits that the clear and decisive lan-
guage of the Chandler Act, together with the recent cases 
under its provisions of Frey v. Frankle, supra; In Re 
Vulcan, supra; Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & 
Company, supra; and Gerson v. Booth Lumber Company, 
supra, controls the subject matter of this action and 
should be decisive in upholding the lower Court. 
POINT II 
MOJAVE'S DEBT WAS NOT REVIVED. 
Appellants' contention is totally incorrect that the 
written promise to pay the sum of $20,000 for the release 
of the Appellants' secured position constitutes a revival 
or reaffirmation which survives the Chapter XI proceed-
ings. It is this very accord and satisfaction, or secondary 
agreement, or novation, or whatever one labels it, that 
is barred and satisfied under the Chapter XI proceedings. 
In Poly Industries, Inc. vs. 1110.zley, 362 F.2d 453 
(1966) the Court at page 456 stated with clarity the 
effect of the confirmation as follows: 
" ... the effect of Section 371 is to . . . provide 
that ... the confirmation of a Chapter XI ar-
rangement acts the same as a discharge is bank-
ruptcy ... " 
It is this discharge in bankruptcy, effective itpon con-
firmation, that is a bar to Mojave's unsccitred claim. 
Mojave being represented by Pinder in the negoti-
ations with Standard, knew that the security was in 
fact worthless. Mojave made the decision to abandon 
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the worthless and non-existent security to better itself 
at the expense of other parity unsecured creditors. The 
very purpose of the Chapter XI proceedings, and one of 
the fundamental requirements by legislative command~ 
is that the arrangement before being confirmed be made 
in good faith and for equal protection to creditors of 
the same class. Mojave desired to be an unsecured 
creditor because of the inadequacy of the security. The 
sole consideration for the agreement on the part of Stand-
ard was to obtain a release of the security. Mojave 
reaped the benefit of its bargain and now after the 
passage of five years desires to be relieved of that bar-
gain. Mojave's insistence of additional considerations 
outside of the Chapter XI proceedings would wreck havoc 
with the provisions of res adjudicata of the clear and 
unambiguous language of the Chandler Act of 1938 
where in Section 371 states : 
"The confirmation of an arrangement shall dis-
charge a debtor from all of his unsecured debts 
and liabilities provided for by the arrangement 
" 
As was stated in Frey vs. Frankel, supra, at page 442, 
" ... when the order of confirmation became final, 
the rights of the parties were fixed as of its 
entry." 
Standard's Order of Confirmation became final by 
its own terms on the 7th day of September, 1962. It is 
res adjudicata to the rights of Mojave and Standard. 
No application has been timely filed under Section 386 
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to set aside or modify the arrangement. To allow Mojave 
to usurp to a higher and more preferred position by 
its own self dealing on dubious claims is to thwart 
completely the language of the present day law and the 
case law which is decisive of the issue before the Court. 
POINT III 
THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIAN CE 
WITH ITS THEORY BELOW, HOWEVER, MESA DID NOT 
CREATE A THIRD P ARY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT IN 
THE SO-CALLED ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT. 
Appellant's claim, according to the pleadings and 
counsel's argument (R. 76 and top of 77) is an action 
based on simple contract for loans allegedly made to 
Standard. All of the proceedings in the lower court 
were in accord with this theory. 
Pursuant to Motion of Appellant dated March 25, 
1968, Appellant was granted leave to amend its Com-
plaint. (R. 49) At this time Appellant had at its dis-
posal the records and files of Respondent, Bruce Coke's 
deposition, and had in fact concluded its discovery. No 
further discovery by either party was made from and 
after March 25, 1968. The Amended Complaint filed 
March 25, 1968 (R. 46-48) does not set out any different 
theory for relief than the original Complaint except that 
it pleads the written agreement between the parties. 
Mojave made its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 10, 1968. (R. 52) Argument before the lower court 
was recorded at request of counsel for appellant. (R. 67-
89) It is very evident that the only theory argued by 
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counsel is the direct contract of Mojave and Standard. 
But now, Appellants assert an entirely different theory: 
A third party beneficiary contract between Mesa and 
Standard for the benefit of Mojave, which is raised by 
Appellant for the first time on appeal. (App. Brf. 14-20) 
A new theory may not be raised upon appeal, Twenty 
Second Corp. Etc. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 
36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); In re Reason's Estate, 
49 Utah 24, 161 Pac. 678 (1916); Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 
451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929); Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork, 
93 Utah 514, 74 P.2d 659 (1937); Upton v. Heiselt, 118 
Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950). In the Evans case, this 
Court stated at 240 Pac.: 
"The rule is well settled that on an appeal the 
parties are restricted to the theory on which the 
case was prosecuted or defended in the court 
below which on appeal must be adhered to and 
cannot be shifted. * * * Whatever liberality may 
be accorded procedure, there nevertheless are 
certain fundamental principles which cannot be 
disregarded. These, among others, are that plead-
ings are the judicial means to invest the court 
with subject-matter jurisdiction and to limit issues 
and to narrow proofs; that courts cannot make a 
complaint for one thing stand for a different 
thing; that recovery must be secundum allegata 
et probata, which is but a necessary deduction 
from the maxim that what is not judicially pre-
sented cannot be judicially decided; that the state-
ment of the cause of action or ground of defense 
as laid binds the court as well as the parties ; and 
that there must be no departure is but another 
statement of the maxim that it is vain to prove 
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what is not alleged. These principles are primary. 
(Citations omitted). 
This Court stated in Pettingill v.s. Perkins, 2 Utah 266, 
272 P.2d 185 (1954) at pages 186 and 187 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"Generally, appellate courts will not review a 
ground of objection not urged at trial court .... 
Having by his own pleadings, evidence, and in-
struction tried and rested . . . upon the theory 
that the mother's negligence would bar the father, 
he is bound thereby, as the law of the case. He 
cannot now on appeal shift his theory and posi-
tion." (Citations omitted). 
Appellant now suddenly on appeal shifts its theory 
of recovery to that of a third party beneficiary contract 
which theory has not been plead nor argued. Appellant 
is bound under its theory of moneys due under an alleged 
loan to Standard; they have no standing to urge upon 
this court a completely different theory now. 
Sound reason and logic lies behind this Court's 
refusal to allow Appellant to switch theorjes at the 
appeal stage. First, no ruling has been made based on 
the new theory upon which an appeal can be taken. 
Secondly, the Respondent has had no opportunity to 
establish and present to the Court any defense or de-
fenses it may have to the new theory. 
The mischief is evident in this instance because the 
agreement between Mesa and Standard has never been 
introduced into evidence. It is this third party contract 
which the Appellant is desirous of this Court to rule 
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upon, yet it is conspicuous by its absence. No merger 
agreement, unless specifically spelled out, grants any 
creditor or group of creditors a different claim than 
that which existed prior to the merger. Yet Appellant, 
in its new theory would have this Court impose a "shed-
ding" of valid and substantial defenses. Appellant would 
have this Court interpret an agTeement which is not even 
part of the record and impose liability on Respondent, 
while denying Respondent the benefits of the assets ob-
tained for assuming those liabilities. 
Assuming arguendo that the new theory is properly 
before this Court, it is insufficient to establish liability. 
Mesa in the merger agreement now stands in the shoes 
of Standard in respect to the defenses as well as the 
liabilities. Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-71 not 
only allows, but asserts without qualification, that Mesa's 
assertion of the bar in bankruptcy is proper. It states: 
"When such merger or consolidation has been 
effected: 
• • • • 
( d) Such surv1vmg or new corporation shall 
thereupon and thereafter possess all the 
rights, privileges, immunities ... of each of the 
merging or consolidating corporation(s) ... " 
(emphasis added) 
The "Agreement of Purchase and Sale and Plan of 
Reorganization" dated July 6, 1965, between Standard 
and Mesa, while its absence from the record is indicative 
that this new theory was never considered by the lower 
Court, by its very terms and conditions is not a third 
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party beneficiary contract. It is a simple merger agree-
ment wherein Mesa became Standard. Whatever defense 
or defenses Standard could assert against Mojave, Mesa 
could and can now assert. Mesa has in fact asserted these 
defenses. No objection was expressed by Mojave in the 
lower Court to these def ens es. Mesa, in the lower Court, 
argued the discharge in Bankruptcy. This in effect is 
Standard's defense. The record below is silent of any 
objection to this defense and Mojave never challenged 
it as being inapplicable. 
Reason and logic would further dictate that Appel-
lant's theory is incorrect. The conclusion reached by 
Appellant would allow all of the creditors of Standard 
to assert a third party beneficiary contract and com-
pletely negate the Chapter XI proceedings and the clear, 
unequivocal provisions of the Chandler Act as enunciated 
by Congress. This conclusion is intolerable. The only 
logical conclusion one can reach about the effect of 
the merger agreement is that Mesa is Standard. In 
becoming Standard, Mesa did not benefit any third party, 
but simply stepped into the shoes of Standard and would 
be answerable, as Standard would have been, to that 
third party. The bar in bankruptcy is a right, privilege 
and immunity which Mesa acquired from Standard in 
1 
the merger. The entire record below dealt with the con-
tractual obligation of Standard to Mojave, if any, and 
the defense of the Chapter XI proceedings to that obli-
gation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower Court was correct in granting Respond-
ent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Ap-
pellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The uncon-
troverted facts place Appellant as an unsecured creditor 
upon the date of confirmation. Mojave released their 
security to become an unsecured creditor knowing of 
the Chapter XI proceedings. Mojave simply placed itself 
in a better position by trading an extremely dubious 
claim with equally dubious security, for an unsecured 
position in the hope of receiving payment. When Mojave 
learned of the merger into Mesa, it withheld filing its 
claim in the bankruptcy proceedng and ultimately brought 
this action. 
The decisive provisions of the Chandler Act, and 
the cases cited to the Court heretofore, dispel any doubt 
whatsoever that as a matter of law, Respondent was and 
is entitled to a Summary Judgment. 
Appellant's new theory is not controlling for the 
reasons that it was never raised at the lower Court, and 
further that the Merger Agreement granted Respondent 
all of the defenses available to Standard, one of which 
is the Chapter XI proceedings. It is, therefore, respect-
fully submitted that this Court affirm the decision of the 
lower Court. Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES R. BROWN and 
ROBERT G. PRUITT, Jr. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1000 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
